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		9 January 1969	
		MEMORANDUM FOR:	25X1
		SUBJECT: Notes on COMIREX Mapping, Charting,	
		and Geodesy Working Group Meeting of	
		7 January 1969	-
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25X1		1. started the meeting by saying that only one subject would be discussed, namely the scheduling of the Doppler	
		Transit/Beacon on a KH-4B mission. He noted that a "permissive" directive had been sent to Dr. Flax by the USIB indicating agreement	
		to the introduction of the Transit/Beacon on a KH-4B to be scheduled	05)/4
		for the "summer" of 1969. He said that was to inform the members on the current status of the situation.	25X1
25X1		2. stated that on 23 December 1968	25X1
25/(1		Dr. Flax had approved inclusion of the Transit/Beacon with KH-4B	
25X1		system but not specifically for the July 1969 mission.	
		3. He said that the USIB's agreement that the NRO add	
		the Doppler beacon to KH-4B systems beginning in the summer of 1969 (USIB-D-46.4/24) was interpreted by Dr. Flax as concurrence	
		if the DoD requested it. It evolved that Dr. Flax apparently does	
		not buy the Air Staff requirement of the June 1970 IOC for the MM-12. He felt that Mission 1/10 in March 1970 should be adequate if such	
05.74		timing is not too incompatible with Air Force real needs. The funding of to cover the Transit/Beacon on the KH-4Bs	
25X1		funding of to cover the Transit/Beacon on the KH-4Bs for four missionsMarch, May, July, and September 1970appears	
		to present no problem.	
		NDO review(a) completed	
		NRO review(s) completed.	
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			a = > 4 :
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group by saying that they were seriously concerned with the delay; that the requirement had been passed through supposedly correct channels to Dr. Flax and there seems to be trouble about what are the proper and effective procedures with regard to handling DoD approved MC&G requirements for final action by the Intelligence Community and, finally, Dr. Flax. It appeared that Dr. Flax unilaterally felt that the summer of 1969 did not reflect the firm requirements for collecting improved target positioning data for the MM-12. on Air Staff studies. suggested that there must be some split in thinking within the Air Force. (Later, I was informed that he has found that the Air Staff is becoming more lenient but there is no slippage in the IOC.) At least a six to nine month lead time is necessary for data reduction in the MC&G community prior to submittal of improved geodetic positioning for targets.	 25X1
6. thought it would take another 6-8 months to get all the hardware for the Transit/Beacon. This means everything would be needed by 1 February 1969 for July 1969. This is almost too tight to be realistic.	
then explained that the whole system is experiencing some troubles is sick. Several things have happened. The men who were initially involved have left, and now they only have second stringers working on correcting the emerging hardware problems. He feels it would be better to get the system working right without putting on some new equipment as early as the KH-4 Mission 1107. Several agreed that this made sense. (There was some rumble as to whether the MM-12's IOC was all that important and that its FOC was a more realistic final date.) requirement could be bent a little it would be best to forget about July 1969.	s. g 25X1
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8. indicated to me that the working group will not oppose the omission of the Eransit/Beacon on the KH-4B July 1969 mission for reasons stated during the meeting. However, he is concerned, as are others, as to the role of COMIREX and USIB in obtaining fulfillment of MC&G requirements and regarding the apparent interpretations that still seem to persist.

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